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Abstract
In this article I try to once again endorse absolute time into the Phi-
losophy of Physics. The way I endorse absolute time is quite natural and
as far as I know is new in the debate (c.f. \The fate of presentism in
modern Physics" Wuthrich 2011 [33]). If a manifold is stable causal one
could provide it with a global time function f via
f(p) =
Z
I (p)
:
where  denotes the entropy production which is integrated over the
chronological past I  of the event p. Time, thus dened, is coordinate
independent and does not depend on the status of motion of any observer.
This idea is based on a theorem and its proof given by Hawking and Ellis
in 1973 [16]. However, I am not a presentist, but I do think that we know
something about the world of \noumena" from physics (mainly from quan-
tum mechanics and quantum eld theory), even if I do not know exactly
what. In this article I start with a discussion of special relativity giving
emphasis to its constraints towards coordinate systems which are dropped
in general relativity. In GR the space-time is a manifold of events, but
without the notion of absolute time. After presenting this point of view
I repeat Kant's theory about how our mind structures the manifold of
events. I believe that one could match Kantian metaphysics more or less
as well with non-equilibrium thermodynamics as with mechanics, like he
did himself. However, unlike Kant, I match causality with the ow of
entropy and not with the ow of impulse. I consider this to be a new idea
around causality.
1 The Special Theory of Relativity and Eternal-
ism
One might think that Kantian philosophy might be a natural starting point for
an article about a causal theory of time. In fact I believe it is easier to under-
stand Kantian philosophy, if the two theories of relativity have been discussed
beforehand. Einstein critisized the the Kantian causal theory of time, which
had previously been widley accepted in Germany.
Terms and conceptual systems recieve authority from their purpose
to overlook experiences that are complex; any other legitimisation
does not exist for them. Therefore, it is my conviction, that one
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of the most destructive acts of certain philosophers was to transfer
some conceptual foundations of science from the control areas, ac-
cessible to the empirical-appropriate, to the unassailable heights of
the necessities of thought (a priori). ... This applies in particular
to our concepts of space and time, which the physicists, forced by
the facts, had to bring down from the Olympus of a priori to repair
them and to put them back into a usable state.
Einstein, A. 1922 p.6 [8], translation M.W.
In detail he criticized the afore never questioned notion of absolute simultaneity.
It is similar in all physical statements that the term \at the same
time" plays a role. The concept exists for the physicist only when
the opportunity is given to nd out in a concrete case whether the
concept applies or not. It requires therefore such a denition of si-
multaneity that this denition gives a method, according to which it
can be decided whether both lightning strikes are carried out simul-
taneously or not. As long as this requirement is not met, I entertain
myself as a physicist (however though as a non-physicist!) an illu-
sion if I think to be able to combine a sense with the statement of
simultaneity . (Before you admit this to me with conviction, dear
reader, do not read on.)
Einstein, A. (1916) p.14 [7] , translation M.W.
Dening time as "the position of the hands of my watch\ (Einstein 1906 p.893
[6]) would yield, using two clocks A and B, two times: an "A-time\ at the place
of A and a "B-time" at the place of B. Therefore these two clocks have to be
synchronized. In order to do that Einstein gave the following proposal. A light
ray should be emmitted from A at time tA and, measured by clock A, and
reected in B at time tB ,measured by clock B. Afterwards the lightray will be
absorbed in A at time t0A. These clocks should be regarded as synchronized if
the following equation holds:
tA   tB = t0A   tB
(Einstein 1906 p.894 [6])
In 1967 Hilary Putnam pointed out that this denition of time implies that
"future things must be real\ (Putnam 1967, p.243 [25]). This position is now
known as "eternalism\. An eternalist believes that there is no ontological dif-
ference between past, present and future. In fact most eternalists think that
it is already senseless to split up the manifold of events into past, present and
future. All you can talk about is earlier and later. This position follows on from
Einstein's denition of time: Consider a second system of reference K 0 which is
moving form A towards B with a velocity v. In this second system of reference
the clocks A and B are not synchronous.
tB   tA = rAB
c+ v
t0A   tB =
rAB
c  v
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(Einstein 1906 pp.896 [6])
and therefore
tA   tB 6= t0A   tB :
Two events (t1; x1; y1; z1) and (t2; x2; y2; z2) being simultaneos in K (which
should mean that t1 = t2) are not simultaneous in K
0 (which means t01 6= t02). If
you are a presentist who believes that only present events exist and K and K 0
agree that (t1; x1; y1; z1) or (t
0
1; x
0
1; y
0
1; z
0
1) is exists, they disagree on the existence
of (t2; x2; y2; z2) or (t
0
2; x
0
2; y
0
2; z
0
2). Only one of the observers K or K
0 can be
right and hence you have to drop the principle of relativity or you have to drop
presentism. Hilary Putnam chose the second possibility. All events exist even
if you regard them as past, present or future. Another possibility is to drop
Einsteins denition of time and this is what Einstein did in the general theory
of relativity albeit for dierent reasons. However, before discussing time in GR
we should see what simultaneity looks like in the reference system K 0, which
means that we have to match every event (t; x; y; z) with its time t0 in K 0.
fK0(t; x; y; z) = t
0
This time function fK0 has to full Einstein's denition of synchronicity and
because of that
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2

fK0(t; 0; 0; 0) + fK0(t+
x  vt
c  v +
x  vt
c+ v
; vt; 0; 0; )

= fK0(t+
x  vt
c  v ; x  vt; 0; 0; )
must hold (Einstein 1906 p.898 [6]). Einstein gives the following result for fK0
fK0(t; x; y; z) =
1q
1  c2
v2
(t  vx
c2
) = t0
which is part of the Lorentz transformations (Einstein 1906 pp.899 [6]). In conclu-
sion there are dierent time functions fK for dierent obsevers K which means,
that there is no absolute time (or time function f) on which every observer will
agree. In order to compare this argument with the general theory of relativity
I will present it in a more general way. Let
 : [tA; tB ]  ! X
with (tA) = (tA; xA) and (tB) = (tB ; xB) be the emitted light ray and
0 : [tB ; t0A]  ! X
with 0(tB) = (tB ; xB) and 0(t0A) = (t
0
A; xA) the reected light ray. The
following equation must hold for the time function in order to full Einstein's
synchcronization fK :M ! R
1
2
[fK(tA; (tA)) + fK(t
0
A; 
0(t0A))] = fK(tB ; (tB)): (1)
The space, being the set of all simultaneous events, is given in this reference
system by
f 1K (t):
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Einstein did not separate between coordinate systems and reference systems.
In Einstein 1906 [6] he understood a coordinate system to be three rectangular
material lines together with some amount of clocks (Einstein 1906 p.897 [6]). The
movement of such a material system of reference should be a rigid body motion
and therefore its motion should be described as an integral curve of a vector
eld vK whose Lie derivative of the spatial metric g jf 1K (t) should vanish.
LvKg jf 1K (t)= 0 (2)
(cf. Choquet-Bruhat, DeWitt-Morette,Dillard-Bleick 1977 p.177 [4])
I do not know, if there are more general solutions to this problem than the
one given in SR, but in his attempt to generalize SR towards arbitrary moving
reference systems Einstein dropped both constraints (1) and (2).
2 Minkowski and the Clock Hypothesis
Noticing that GR is in contradiction to SR is not new and Einstein himself
already acknowledged to this statement.
Since the opponents of the theory of relativity often claimed that the
special theory of relativity had been messed up by the general theory
of relativity, I will make the real facts apparent using a comparison.
Prior to the formulation of electrodynamics the laws of electrostat-
ics had been viewed to be the very laws of electricity. Today we
know that the laws of electrostatics can only provide electric elds
correctly in the never strictly realized case in which the electrical
masses rest exactly relative to each other and the coordinate sys-
tem. Has electrostatics therefore been messed up by Maxwell's eld
equations of electrodynamics? Not at all! Electrostatics is included
as a limiting case in electrodynamics, and the laws of the latter lead
to the former in the case where the elds are temporally invariable.
It is the most beautiful lot of a physical theory, to show the way
forward to a more comprehensive theory, in which it lives on as a
limiting case.
Einstein, A. (1916) p.50 [7], translation M.W.
Do we really regain the theory of special relativity if we consider the Minkowski
space-time? Let us compare how SR and GR, in Minkowski space-time deal
with the famous twin paradox. Consider two twins. The rst one stays at
home, whereas the second one travels with a velocity of 0.28c towards planet C
which is 4.2 ly away. Arriving at this planet he will immediately return back to
earth.
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Fig.2.1 The twin paradox in SR
For the rst twin this journey would take 30 years but according to SR time
passes slower for the moving twin, so this twin would age only
p
1  0:282 30 =
28:8 years. At rst sight this situation seems to be at odds with the principle
of relativity because the second twin could state that he was resting while the
rst twin was moving. Therefore, the second twin expects his sibling to agep
1  0:282  28:8 = 27:648 years during their separation. Who is right now?
Did 30 or 27:648 years pass for the rst twin? The correct answer is 30 years
because the second twin did not consider that his sibling gained from the mo-
ment E to the next moment F 2:352 years due to the relativity of simultaneity.
This explanation seems to be rather unlikely, but it is of the same type of argu-
mentation that led to Putnams eternalism. Let us see how what this situations
looks like in terms of GR. If we assume, for simplicity of the calculations, that
the second twin is now moving on a smooth curve
2 : [0; 30]  ! R2
t 7 ! (t;  7
375
t(t  30))
while the rst twin simply "travels\ along
1 : [0; 30]  ! R2
t 7 ! (t; 0):
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Fig.2.1 The twin paradox in GR
For the rst twin this journey takesZ
1
ds =
Z
1
p
dt2   dx2   dy2   dz2
=
30yZ
0
dt
= 30y:
but for the second twin his journey takesZ
2
ds =
Z
1
p
dt2   dx2   dy2   dz2
=
30yZ
0
r
12   (210
375
  14
375
t)2dt
= 28:348y:
Let us see how this situations appears to the second twin.
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Fig.2.1 The twin paradox in GR
In this coordinatesystem the duration of the rst twins journey is calculated by
Z
1
ds =
Z
1
vuut"1  210
375
  14
375
t
2#
dt02 + 2

210
375
  14
375
t

dt0dx0   dx02
=
30yZ
0
s
1 

210
375
  14
375
t
2
+ 2

210
375
  14
375
t

2  

210
375
  14
375
t
2
dt0
=
30yZ
0
dt0 = 30y:
For the second twin we compute
Z
2
ds =
Z
1
vuut"1  210
375
  14
375
t
2#
dt02 + 2

210
375
  14
375
t

dt0dx0   dx02
=
30yZ
0
s
1 

210
375
  14
375
t
2
dt0
= 28:348y:
The explanation of the twin paradox via the relativity of simultaneity in SR
is replaced in GR by the clock hypothesis. The clock hypothesis ,which was
endorsed by Hermann Minkowski in his famous lecture Minkowski, H. 1908 [21],
states that the time given by a clock is calculated by
R

ds which is coordinate
independent. Minkowski started his lecture from a very eternalistic point of
view.
Henceforth space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade
away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will
preserve an independent reality.
Minkowski, H. 1908 [21]
I think this eternalistic point of view was based on a mathematical error.
Minkowski described the Lorentz transformations to be hyperbolic rotations
which preserve the Minkowski metric ds2 = c2dt2  dx2  dy2  dz2 in the same
way ordinary rotations preserve the Euclidian metric dx2+ dy2+ dz2. Actually
Lorenztransformations, strictly speaking the "boosts\, are spatial displacements
on the hyperbolic spaces f 1(t) with f(t; x; y; z) =
p
c2dt2   dx2   dy2   dz2.
This interpretation diers drastically from the one Einstein gave in Einstein 1906
[6]. The Minkowski space, or more accurate, the future light cone possesses a -
bration of hyperbolic spaces in the same way the Newtonian space time consists
of a bration of Euclidian spaces. This possibility had already been discussed
by Poincare in 1904.
Geometry and Astronomy.|The same question may also be asked
in another way. If Lobatschewski's geometry is true, the parallax
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of a very distant star will be nite. If Riemann's is true, it will
be negative. These are the results which seem within the reach
of experiment, and it is hoped that astronomical observations may
enable us to decide between the three geometries. But what we call
a straight line in astronomy is simply the path of a ray of light. If,
therefore, we were to discover negative parallaxes, or to prove that
all parallaxes are higher than a certain limit, we should have a choice
between two conclusions: we could give up Euclidean geometry, or
modify the laws of optics, and suppose that light is not rigorously
propagated in a straight line. It is needless to add that everyone
would look upon this solution as the more advantageous.
Poincare, H. (1904) pp.83 [23]
Modern experiments tell us that the universe is more or less at. Nevertheless,
we do not believe in Euclidian geometry any more.
We have also seen that dening time by "the hands of a watch\ and then
spreading out this time with synchronous clocks is too restrictive, but dening
time by the proper time
R

ds of a clock (cf. Stein H. (1991) [30]) would lead to
solipsism. Therefore, we are left with two choices:
 Eternalism: The subjective sensation of a passing time is an illusion.
 Kantian idealism: There is an objective but ideal notion of time corre-
sponding to our subjective sensation of a passing time.
But not only the fact that Einstein dropped in GR the constraints (1) for time
to full the Einstein synchronization causes some confusion. Missing the con-
straints (2) "a reference system should be linked to a rigid body\ causes prob-
lems as well.
There are no rigid bodies with Euclidean properties in gravitational
elds. Therefore, the ction of the rigid body reference system fails
in the general theory of relativity. Furthermore, the rate of the
clocks is inuenced in such a way by gravitational elds
that a physical time denition directly using watches does
not have quite that degree of evidence as in the special the-
ory of relativity. Consequently, one uses therefore non-rigid body
reference systems, which not only move as a whole arbitrarily, but
they also undergo any shape changes during their movement. To de-
ne time one uses clocks of any, even irregular, transition law, which
have to be thought of being fastened to the reference body, each
at one point, and which meet only one requirement that the same
perceptible information of locally adjacent clocks dier innitely lit-
tle. This non-rigid reference-body, which cannot be wrongly called
"reference-mollusc\ is substantially equivalent to any Gaussian co-
ordinate system.
Einstein, A. (1916) p.65 [7], translation M.W.
Hermann Weyl pointed out that there is no relative motion towards an arbitrary
moving "reference mollusc\.
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First, we note that the term of the relative motion of two bod-
ies against each other has as little a meaning in the general
theory of relativity as the concept of absolute movement of
a single body. As long as the rigid body of reference was still avail-
able and one could believe in objectivity of simultaneity, according
to Mach, for example, under the rule of the "kinematic group\ there
was a relative motion; but in the general theory of relativity the
coordinate system has so weakened , that it is no longer a question..
In whichever way the two bodies may move, I can always transform
them together at rest by the introduction of a suitable coordinate
system.
Weyl, H (1922) p.268 [32], translation M.W.
Einstein saw the problems of his denition of time and space.
Why is the obvious equivalence of the practically-rigid body of ex-
perience and the body of geometry rejected by Poincare and other
researchers? Simply because on closer inspection the solid bodies
are not rigid, because their geometric behaviour, i.e. their relative
storage facilities, depend on temperature, external forces, etc.. ...
Sub specie aeterni Poincare was right with this view. There is no
object in the real world that exactly corresponds to the concept of
a measuring rod and to the concept of a measuring clock. It is also
clear that the solid body and the clock do not play the part of ir-
reducible elements in the concept of fundamental physics, but the
role of compound structures that may play no independent role in
building physics. Though, it is my belief that these terms at today's
stage of development of theoretical physics must be used as inde-
pendent items because we are still too far away from such a secure
knowledge of the theoretical foundations of atomism to be able to
give exact theoretical constructions of these structures.
Einstein, A. (1916) pp.122 [9], translation M.W.
Feynman frankly admitted his confusion about these topics.
Poincare made the following statement of the principle of relativ-
ity: "According to the principle of relativity, the laws of physical
phenomena must be the same for a xed observer as for an ob-
server who has uniform motion of translation relative to him, so
that we have not, nor can we possibly have any means of discerning
whether or not we are carried along in such a motion.\ When this
idea descended upon the world, it caused a great stir among philoso-
phers, particularly the "cocktail-party philosophers\ who say, "Oh,
it is very simple: Einstein's theory says all is relative.\ In fact, a
surprisingly large number of philosophers, not only those found at
cocktail parties (but rather to embarrass them, we shall just call
them "cocktail-party philosophers\), will say, "That all is relative
is a consequence of Einstein, and it has profound inuences on our
ideas.\ In addition they say "It has been demonstrated in physics
that phenomena depend on your frame of reference.\ We hear that a
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great deal, but it is dicult to nd out what it means. Prob-
ably the frames of reference that were originally referred to
were the coordinate systems we use in the analysis of the
theory of relativity.
Feynman, R. P. (1963) p.16-1 [11]
I do not know why Feynman blames the philosophers for problems, arising from
the ill dened notion "frame of reference\ in GR. Nevertheless some philosophi-
cal discussions really might turn out to be mute. Calling the manifold of events
a space-time and discussing its ontological status, like substancealists, relation-
alists or supersubstancealists do, would already mean to neglect Kant, to whom
ontologie reduces to an "analytic of pure reason\. This means that at rst we
would have to construct objects out of the manifold of events before we could
judge their ontological status.
3 Kant's Causal Theory of Time
In his "History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and
Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day\ Bertrand
Russell starts his Chapter about Kantian philosophy with the remark that the
British Empirists had been
... socially minded citizens, by no means self-assertive, not unduly
anxious for power, and in favour of a tolerant world where, within
the limits of the criminal law, every man could do as he pleased.
They were good-natured, men of the world, urbane and kindly.
and he ends this chapter with
The Ego as a metaphysical concept easily became confused with the
empirical Fichte; since the Ego was German, it followed that the
Germans were superior to all other nations. "To have character and
to be German\ says Fichte, "undoubtedly mean the same thing.\
On this basis he worked out a whole phiosophy of nationalistic to-
talitarianism, which had great inuence in Germany.
Russell, B (1940) pp.728 [28]
This context of political and social circumstances is understandable under the
impression of two world wars and National Socialism. Philosophically it is not
helpful. It is common, but nevertheless absurd to call empirism British and
idealism German. From Russells framing of Kantian philosophy one gets the
impression that it cannot be a coincidence that Kantian philosophy had been
overcome by a Jew who emigrated to the USA. Einstein himself comented on
Russell's philosophy.
Hume not only promoted philosophy by his clear criticism, but has
become a threat to it through no fault of his own, as "fatal fear
of metaphysics\ came to life through this criticism, which means a
disease of the present empirical philosophy. This disease is the coun-
terpart to that earlier misty-eyed philosophising, which thought to
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be able to dispense and neglect the sensual given. For all admiration
for the astute analysis Russell has given us in his book "Meaning and
Truth\, it seems to me that there has been some damage done by the
spectre of metaphysical anxiety. This fear seems to me, for exam-
ple, the occasion for conceiving the "thing\ as a bundle of qualities,
where the qualities were taken from the sensual raw material. The
fact now that two things should be one and the same thing if they
match in respect to all the qualities, forces the ranking of geometric
relations of things towards each other among its qualities. (Other-
wise, you will be forced by Russell to view the Eiel Tower in Paris
and in New York as the same thing.) In contrast, I see no danger
in incorporating the thing (object in the sense of physics) as an in-
dependent concept of the system in conjunction with the associated
time-spatial structure. In view of such eorts, it has satised me
that in the last chapter it comes out that one cannot do without
metaphysics after all. The only thing I have to complain about, is
the bad intellectual conscience that gleams between the lines.
Einstein, A. (1946) found in [9] pp.39, translation M.W.
It is because of the fact that geometrical relations are not purely spatial in the
special theory of relativity that Russell is lead to an occurrent ontology.
What is important to the philosopher in the theory of relativity is the
substitution of space-time for space and time. Common sense thinks
of the physical world as composed of \things" which persist through
a certain period of time and move in space. Philosophy and physics
developed the notion \thing" into that of \material substance", and
thought of material substance as consisting of particles, each very
small, and each persisting throughout all time. Einstein substituted
events for particles; each event had to each other a relation called
\interval," which could be analysed in various ways into a time-
element and a space-element. The choice between these various ways
was arbitrary, and no one of them was theoretically preferable to
any other. Given two events A and B, in dierent regions, it might
happen that according to one convention they were simultaneous,
according to another A was earlier than B, and according to yet
another B was earlier than A. No physical facts correspond to these
dierent conventions. From all this it seems to follow that events, not
particles, must be the \stu" of physics. What has been thought
of as a particle will have to be thought of as a series of events.
This series of events that replaces a particle has certain important
physical properties, and therefore demands our attention; but it has
no more substantiality than any other series of events that we might
arbitrarily single out. Thus \matter" is not part of the ultimate
material of the world, but merely a convenient way of collecting
events into bundles.
Russell, B (1940) pp.860 [28]
In fact most of this is in agreement with Kantian philosophy. But we have to
ask further \What are the categories under which we combine events to matter,
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and do these categories got inuence on the constructed matter?" The bundle of
qualities I am used to calling "me\, together with the relation to other bundles
of qualities I usually call "lying in bed\, would indeed yield to a dierent entity
as the bundle of qualities "me\ together with the relations "sitting in front of
my desk\ if "lying in bed\ and "sitting in front of my desk\ would not happen
to occur one after another. My identity persists in time.
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in its relation
to sensibility is, according to the Transcendendal Aesthetic, that all
the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions
of space and time. The supreme principle of the same possibility,
in its relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition
should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of
apperception. In so far as the manifold representations of intuition
are given to us, they are subject to the former of these two principles;
in so far as they must allow of being combined in one consciousness,
they are subject to the latter. For without such combination nothing
can be thought or known, since the given representations would not
have in common the act of the apperception 'I think', and so could
not be apprehended together in one self-consciousness.
Kant, I. (1787) p. B 136 [20]
This reerrence to Descartes famous 'Cogito ergo sum' led to Russell describing
Kant's theory of time and space as subjective. Mauro Dorato for example, gives
three conditions for the ideality of time in Kant's sense:
(i) time must be non substantial, and the resulting relationism must
be constructed in such a way that both (ii) the dierence between
past and future and that (iii) between earlier and later than, must
be mind-dependent.
He asks the question:
Is time a subjective pure ideal notion - transcendental in the sense of
Kant - or is it rather part of the mind-independent physical furniture
of the universe?
Dorato, M. (2002) p. 1 [5]
In Kantian philosophy this understanding of subjective to be the opposite of
objective is highly misleading.
The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive.
The representations of the parts follow upon one another. Whether
they also follow one after another in the object is a point which
calls for further reection, and which is not decided by the above
statement.
Kant, I. (1787) p. B 234 [20]
If we want to be in possession of knowledge the subjective temporal order has
to agree with the objective temporal order.
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Empirical judgements, insofar as they have objective validity, are
judgements of experience; those however, that are only subjectively
valid I call mere judgements of perceptions. The latter do not require
pure concepts of the understanding, but only the logical connection
of perceptions in a thinking subject. But the former always demand,
beyond the representations of sensory intuition, in addition special
concepts originally generated in the understanding, which are pre-
cisely what make the judgement of experience objectively valid.
Kant, I. (1783) p. [4:298] [18]
Movies enable us to separate the percepted temporal order from the original
and objective temporal order. If a movie is played backwards we would be able
to tell that at once. Furthermore, imagine all pictures of a movie were shown to
us in an accidental order; our mind wouldn't be able to construct objects out of
the given sensual data because no sensual impression would persist long enough.
If the pictures are given to us in the right order, our mind is able to form out
of a screen of ickering lights three dimensional objects. I think this example
proves that our mind indeed adds something while constructing objects out of
sensual data.
I will not discuss if Kant's theory of time is well founded in itself. However, I
will present some of his results and I will examine if they are in agreement or
disagreement with modern physics. According to Kantian philosophy our mind
structures the manifold M of events by the inner sense
f : M  ! R:
A mapping like this is mathematically called a global time function. We have
to ask if it is well dened or like mathematicians call it: Does a global time
function exist? In principle this question is settled. If and even if our space-
time or the manifold of events is stable causal, there is a global time function.
(Hawking and Ellis 1973 p.198 [16]). This result is important for presentists.
A presentist belives that only present events exist. The present consists of
simultaneous events. Simultaneity is an equivalence relation and time could
be regarded as the quotient space of all events under this equivalence relation.
The mapping from the manifold of events to its quotient space is a global time
function and therefore the existence of a global time function follows from the
assumption of presentism. Simple logic tells us that if there is no global time
function, presentism is wrong. Certainly presentism implies that there is only
one ontological preferred global time function. There might be lots of global time
functions and the eternalists wants to know which one is the correct one. The
eternalist is an eternalist because he is convinced that time must be empirically
founded, and he wants to know if there is a geometrical or otherwise preferred
foliation. The presentists answer, that the ontological preferred one, is the right
one does not satisfy him. The presentist cannot convince the eternalist and the
eternalist cannot prove that an ontological preferred global time function does
not exist. Therefore, this controversy reaches an impasse. The Kantian idealist
shares with the eternalist the assumption that the lapse of time cannot be taken
from human experience, but contrary to the eternalist, who thinks that the lapse
of time is an illusion, the Kantian idealist thinks that it is a necessary notion for
knowledge. The idealist agrees with the presentist that the lapse of time is real,
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but only in the sense that every physical theory has to contain the lapse of time
because otherwise it could not be matched with experience. Further ontological
judgement is not possible. What would be the metaphysical foundations of a
global time function which we could name "absolute time\? Let us consider
Kant's analogies of experience.
Analogies of Experience.
The principle of the analogies is: Experience is possible only through
the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. (p. B
218)
1. Principle of Permanence of Substance
In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quan-
tum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (p. B 224)
2. Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of
Causality
All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the
connection of cause and eect. (p. B 232)
3. Principle of Coexistence, in accordance with the Law of Reci-
procity or Community.
All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in
space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity (p. B 232)
Kant, I. (1787) [20]
If Kantian philosophy is right, those principles should enable us to endorse an
objective time ordering, including past, present and future, which would mean
endorsing a global time function.
4 How to Combine Kantian Metaphysics with
Physics
Kants "Metaphysical Foundations on Natural Science\ gives the following the-
orems resulting from the analogies of experience.
 First law of mechanics: Through all changes of corporeal na-
ture, the over-all amount of matter remains the same| neither
increased nor lessened. (p.541)
 Second law of mechanics: Every change in matter has an exter-
nal cause. (Every motionless body remains at rest, and every
moving body continues to move in the same direction at the
same speed, unless an external cause compels it to change.)
(p.543)
 Third mechanical law : In all communication of motion, action
and reaction are always equal to one another. (p.544)
Kant, I. (1786) [20]
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It seems that the connection of the third analogy with the third mechanical
law needs Newton's instantaneous gravitational force, although Kant does not
discuss this issue in detail. The special theory of relativity tells us that the action
of gravitation and all other forces cannot be submitted with greater speed than
the speed of light. Therefore, the third mechanical law, which describes a global
conservation of impulse, has to be replaced by a local conservation of impulse.
One believes that nothing can be used - even in principle - to synchronize clocks
instantaneously. As a result one believes that the causal structure of a space-
time had to be changed. In pre-relativity physics all events in space-time are
either, relative to a given event p, to the future of p, to the past of p, or
simultaneous with p. All events simultaneous to p form a three dimensional
surface in space-time.
Fig. 4.1. Causal structure of pre-relativistic space-time
In special relativity and in general relativity the "surface of simultaneity\
is replaced by a "light cone\. All events wich can be inuenced by p lie in the
future light cone and all events which could possibly inuence p lie in the past
light cone (Wald 1984 p.5) [31].
Fig. 4.2. Causal structure of relativistic spacetime
It appears that without instantaneous forces causality cannot yield to an
absolute time. Nevertheless, it is just conventional not necessary to match
causality with the exchange of impulse (in a gravitational eld) even though
some philosophers use the term force as a synonym for cause. Wilhelm Wien
criticized this convention.
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If one denotes the causality as the set of cause and eect, he has
worked in theoretical physics more confusing than enlightening. By
designating of a force as the cause, whereas a movement as an eect,
an ambiguity is brought into the mechanics which was not removed
until Kirchho, as he made it to mechanics business to describe the
motion in the most complete and easiest way. This description is,
however, not thought of in terms of geography, but in the formation
of mathematical relationships from which all questions, one could
ask about the described movement, can be answered by their reso-
lution. This list of functional relationships is actually quite the task
of theoretical physics. Causality is not mentioned in doing so.
Wien, W. (1915) found in [29] p.210 (translation M.W.)
Russell shared this point of view in "On the Notion of Cause\ Russell, B (1912)
[27] .
A teacher of mine (Prof. Schlichting) had his own version of Kant's Kopernika-
nean turn: "Physicists tend to see the world in a way it is not\ by which he meant
that physicists watch the world in terms of Newtonian mechanics and have a ten-
dency to ignore dissipative forces and entropy production. Due to this they end
up in a timeless point of view of the world. Although, one could match the analo-
gies of experience (except for the third maybe) just as well with phenomelogical
non-equilibrum thermodynamics as with mechanics. Due to Einsteins famous
formula E = mc2 we have to regard energy instead of mass as the conserved
quantum of matter and therefore phenomenological non-equilibrum thermody-
namics is in fact fundamental to mechanics. In thermodynamics the exchange
of energy is described for example by: dE = vxdpx+vydpy+vzdpz+pdV +TdS
where velocity vx; vy; vz , pressure p and temperature T are the intensive vari-
ables and impulse px; py; pz, volume V and entropy S are the extensive variables.
Mechanics is just the part of thermodynamics which describes the exchange of
mechanical energy dE = vxdpx+vydpy+vzdpz where force is the ow of impulse
Fx =
dpx
dt . In the frame of thermodynamics there is no need to dene the conser-
vation of impulse globally by actio = reactio. In phenomelogical nonequilibrum
thermodynamics impulse is conserved locally @px@t +
@jxx
@x +
@jxy
@y +
@jxz
@z = 0 but,
as I already said, it is not necessary to match the ow of impulse with causality.1
Let us consider two examples Kant gave.
 For instance, the apprehension of the manifold in the appear-
ance of a house which stands before me is successive. The
question arises, whether the manifold of the house is also in
itsself successive. This however, is what no one will grant (p.
B.235). ...
 For instance, when I see a ship move down the stream. My
perception of its lower position follows upon its position higher
up on the stream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension
of this appearance the ship should rst be percieved lower down
the stream and afterwards higher up.
1The reader who is interested in how physics, based on non-equilibrum thermodynamics,
looks like, might refer to Falk, G. and Ruppel, W. (1973) [10] and the literature given there.
Due to the fact that Gottfried Falk changed from the eld of mathematical physics to didactics
of physics, you can learn this kind of physics from textbooks for pupils!
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The order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehen-
sion is in this instance determined, and to this order apprehension
is bound down. In the previous example of a house my perceptions
could begin with the apprehension of the roof and end with the
basement, or could begin from below and end above; and I could
similarly apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition either
from right to left or from left to right. In the series of these percep-
tions there was thus no determinate order specifying at what point I
must begin in order to connect the manifold empirically. But in the
perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order
in which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance)
follow upon one another in a necessary order.
Kant, I. (1787) pp. B 237 [20]
Eternalism, which regards the universe as some kind of a block universe is ap-
propriate for the rst example, but it does not t the second example. Although,
eternalism is not in contradiction to the second example it does not yield an
explanation that the temporal order of processes is always clear. Remember the
above given example of a movie that is played backwards. The laws of thermo-
dynamics combine events to processes and the second law gives them a direction
towards increasing entropy and increasing time. Due to this fact I propose to
interpret the measure used in the proof of Hawkings and Ellis' theorem "a stable
causal manifold admits a global time function\ to be the entropy production.
The entropy balance, written in dierential forms, is simply ds = . s is a
3-form, in coordinates sdxdydz   jsdtdydz + jydtdxdz   jzdtdxdy with s being
the entropy density and (jx; jy; jz) being the ow of entropy. In conclusion the
entropy production  is a 4-form appropriate for measuring four dimensional
volumes. The chronological past I  of an event is the set of events that can
be reached by a past directed time like curve starting from p. (cf. Wald, R.M.
(1984) p. 190 [31]) . I propose to dene the absolute time function f(p) of an
event p by the entropy produced in its past
f(p) =
Z
I (p)
:
This time function f could be called absolute because it would be coordinate
independent and would not depend on the status of motion of an observer. Yet
why do I call this a causal theory of time? In Kant's example of a ship that
oats down the river we could easily imagine that it goes upstream. It is not
necessary for a ship to go downstream. However, there has to be a cause for
such "unusual\ behaviour. The ship going against the tide probably burns fuel.
To every process which lowers entropy there is a second process which increases
entropy even more. This ensures that the entropy production in the past of
an event is always positive. (The moment I watch a ship this ship is already
in my past.) Entropy is never destroyed. The process which increases entropy
takes the entropy of the process with decreasing entropy and the process taking
entropy is the cause for the process giving entropy. Causation is more suitably
(but not exclusively) linked with the ow of entropy than with the ow of im-
pulse. Another example: A refrigerator lowers the temperature in its inside
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but heats up its environment. The heat energy goes from places of low tem-
perature to places of higher temperature ant therefore the refrigerator appears
to lower entropy. However, if you look closer and it is a refrigerator running
on gas you will spot a little ame, which produces entropy. Undoubtedly this
little ame causes the lowering of temperature in the inside of the refrigerator
(and the heating of its environement) no matter how this refrigerator works in
detail. Dening the absolute time function f by entropy production might be
another empirical way of dening time, replacing the denition based on clocks
which count repetitions of periodic processes, but I prefer my proposal to be
understood dierent. The notion of time is prior to the notion of en-
tropy. R. Giles denes entropy by the capability of a process to drive another
one backwards. Giles R. (1964) [12] . therefore, the ideal and subjective notion
of time in the sense of Kant still possesses an objective meaning which is based
on causality. Finally, I will give a lengthy quote out of Ilya Prigogines "From
Being to Becomming\ because it ts so well. This quote is found in a chapter
titled "Einstein Dilemma\.
Among the most moving documentation of Einstein's life is the col-
lection of letters that he exchanged with his old friend Michele Besso
(Einstein 1972). Einstein was usually very reticent about himself,
but Besso was a very special case. They knew each other at an
early age in Zurich when Einstein was seventeen and Besso twenty-
three. Besso took care of Einstein's rst wife and their children in
Zurich when Einstein was working in Berlin. Although the aection
between Besso and Einstein remained deep, their interests diverged
with the years. Besso became more and more involved in litera-
ture and philosophy|in the very meaning of human existence. He
knew that, to obtain a response from Einstein, he had to include
problems of a scientic nature, but his interest was more and more
elsewhere. Their friendship lasted their whole lives, Besso having
died only a few months earlier than Einstein in 1955. It is mainly
the last part of the correspondence between 1940 and 1955 that is
of interest to us here. There Besso returned again and again to the
problem of time. What is irreversibility? How does it relate to the
basic laws of physics? And patiently Einstein answered again and
again, irreversibility is an illusion, a subjective impression, coming
from exceptional initial conditions. Besso remained dissatised. His
last scientic paper was a contribution to the Archives des Sciences
published in Geneva. At the age of eighty, he presented an attempt
to reconcile general relativity and irreversibility of time. Einstein
was not happy with this attempt: "You are on a gliding ground,"
he wrote. " There is no irreversibility in the basic laws of physics.
You have to accept the idea that subjective time with its emphasis
on the now has no objective meaning." When Besso passed away,
Einstein wrote a moving letter to his widow and son: " Michele has
preceded me a little in leaving this strange world. This is not impor-
tant. For us who are convinced physicists, the distinction between
past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent."
Prigogine, I (1980) p.202 [24]
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5 Conclusions
Kant is often read as if he had tried to give Newton's mechanics security a priori
and therefore his philosophy had been superseded by the theory of relativity.
But indeed Kant was aware that it could not be his aim to give physics security
a priori.
Pure mathematics and pure natural science would not have needed,
for the purpose of their own security and certainty, a deduction of the
sort that we have hitherto accomplished for them both; for the rst is
supported by its own evidence, and the second, though arising from
pure sources of the understanding, is nonetheless supported from
experience and thoroughgoing conrmation by it - experience being
a witness that natural science cannot fully renounce and dispense
with, because, as philosophy, despite all its certainty it can never
rival mathematics. Neither science had need of the aforementioned
investigation itself, but for another science, namely metaphysics.
Kant, I. (1783) p. [4:327] [18]
Kant commented on his insight
... , that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put
into them.
Kant, I. (1787) p. B xviii [20]
with the remark
This method, modelled on that of the student of nature, consists in
looking for the elements of pure reason in what admits of conrma-
tion or refutation by experiment.
Kant, I. (1787) p. B xix [20]
What Kant learned about metaphysics from Newton's mechanics and Clarkes
dispute with Leibnitz towards absolute space is still interesting today. It occurs
to me that the statement: "Every synthetical judgement had to be deriven from
empirism\ together with the special theory of relativity had led to a not yet fully
closed heuristic circle via logical positivism, critical rationalism towards Quine's
holism.
"You do not seriously think that one could just pick up observable
quantities in a physical theory? "
Einstein asked. Heisenberg answered:
\I thought, you founded the theory of relativity on this thought?
You did stress, that one cannot talk about absolute time, because
this absolute time is not observable. Just the information given by
clocks, may the reference systems move or not, are decisive for the
denition of time.\
"Maybe I used this kind of philosophy\
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Einstein repeated,
"nevertheless this is nonsense. Or, I should say more carefully, it
may be of heuristic value to remember what is observed. But in
principle it is completely wrong to found a physical theorie on just
what one can observe. In reality it is just the other way round. The
theory decides what is to be observed or not.\
Heisenberg, W. (1927) p.92 [17] translation M.W.
I guess what Feynman said about velocity might apply here too.
Many physicists think that measurement is the only denition of
anything. Obviously, then, we should use the instrument that mea-
sures the speed - the speedometer - and say, "Look, lady, your
speedometer reads 60.\ So she says, "My speedometer is broken
and didn't read at all.\ Does that mean the car is standing still?
We believe that there is something to measure before we build the
speedometer. Only then we can say, for example, "the speedometer
isn't working right,\ or "the speedometer is broken.\ That would
be a meaningless sentence if the velocity had no meaning indepen-
dent of the speedometer. So we have in our minds, obviously,
an idea that is independent of the speedometer, and the
speedometer is meant only to measure this idea.
Feynman, R. P. (1963) p.8-3 [11]
The purpose of a clock is to measure what we have got in mind when we speak
about time. The clock hypothesis states that our current clocks which count
repetitions of periodic processes fail to do so. Does that mean we have to give
up our notion of time? Keep in mind that we are already able to endorse a
perfectly prerelativistic coordinate system via the Global Navigation Satellite
System by calculating relativistic eects and removing them from the GNSS.
That does not please everybody.
Globally, the current situation in the Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) is almost analogous to the following one: imagine
that a century after Kepler, the astronomers were still using Ke-
pler's laws as algorithms to correct epicycles by means of "Keple-
rian eects\. Similarly, a century after Einstein, one still uses the
Newtonian theory and corrects it by "relativistic or Einsteinian ef-
fects" instead of starting with Einstein's gravitational theory from
the beginning.
Pascual-Sanchez, J.-F. ,San Miguel, A. and Vicente, F (2007) p.1 [22]
We believe in the second law of thermodynamics and in the general theory of
relativity and it turns out that if the principle of stable causality holds, we could
use the entropy production to endorse a global time function which we may be
able measure some day. Nevertheless, the notion of time is an ideal one and
time might not belong to the things in themselves.
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